base_model: Jackrong/Qwopus3.8-27B-Flash
library_name: mlx
license: apache-2.0
language: [en, zh, es, ru, ja]
pipeline_tag: image-text-to-text
tags: [mlx, mtplx, qwen3_8, quantized, mxfp8, vision, mtp, speculative-decoding, abliterated]
Qwopus3.8 27B Flash · Abliterated MXFP8 Vision MTPLX
Higher-fidelity refusal-direction-edited Apple-Silicon MLX derivative of Jackrong/Qwopus3.8-27B-Flash, with an MXFP8 text body plus the source model's unchanged BF16 vision tower and native BF16 MTP sidecar.
Artifact
| Component | Format |
|---|---|
| Text body | MXFP8; norm-preserving abliteration strength 1.5 |
| Edit scope | Attention + dense-down modules; 128 exact edits |
| Vision tower | Unchanged BF16, 333 tensors |
| Native MTP sidecar | Unchanged BF16, 15 tensors, depth 3 |
| Source revision | 44d24e8cb20ceb3cdf4fe200b5a0afd970ee748a |
| Qualified runtime | MTPLX 2.11.1 / MLX 0.32.2 |
The refusal direction was learned from fresh MXFP8-parent activations, then each exact quantized parent was dequantized, edited, and requantized once. Direction SHA-256: c5b755d709dba8fedc0c2717f2c971b690f30bd8a2f6c9497ed9a6104f7f255d.
Run
mtplx serve --model Shiftedx/qwopus3.8-27b-flash-abliterated-mxfp8-vision-mtplx \
--download --profile sustained --depth 3 --no-auth
Local qualification
| Test | Parent | Abliterated |
|---|---|---|
| Held-out harmful-prompt refusal | 100% | 0% |
| Benign refusal | 0% | 0% |
| Utility pass | 100% | 100% |
The held-out set is a narrow local prompt suite, not a general safety or capability certification.
One cold 192-token code row, seed 42, on an M4 Max 64 GB with automatic fan control: 14.60 tok/s AR, 43.82 tok/s MTP D3, 3.00×. AR/D1/D2/D3 output checks passed; MTPLX reported verified, runnable, and 15/15 MTP tensors. Text and vision smokes passed exactly.
Integrity and limitations
- Vision SHA-256:
7a252e5c7bb02ed6533f905a566ab037356ffb4949d04df8d6d2a3fa5e3af6b9 - MTP SHA-256:
4468f39621de68a19ffd0bcb2e2e2f352205def7436a625b3427e3752866c287 SHA256SUMScovers every packaged artifact file except itself.- Abliteration intentionally weakens refusal behavior; it does not establish unrestricted capability or safe behavior. Users remain responsible for deployment controls and outputs.
- The upstream tokenizer's Mistral-regex warning is preserved. The packaged chat template expects string-valued message content.