← back to catalog · registered 2026-08-29 05:03

naimulislam999/LFM2.5-230M-Uncensored

Your rig guess connected
? Why do I need an app?
Reading your rig…

This is a rough estimate. Install the free app - we'll show exact numbers.

Reading real hardware from your app right now. Numbers below are exact.

Below is the per-quantization compatibility for this model.

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ABL_KEY" \
     "https://abliteration.org/api/v1/models/naimulislam999%2FLFM2.5-230M-Uncensored"
Response includes
  • classification m-uncensored
  • files 9
  • author_summary 6 models
  • readme_text full
10 credits · hourly refresh · ~4 KB payload Get an API key →
Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M-U
Primary method

Uncensored (method unknown)

No other method signals detected in this model.
Confidence
LOW
Why this label 3 signals
Weak or ambiguous signals. Best guess based on catalog patterns; treat as tentative and check the evidence below.
  • 'uncensored' in name/tags but no 'abliterated' marker
  • method not identifiable from author declaration alone
  • may be DPO fine-tune, prompt engineering, or unknown technique
Refusal direction extraction

No specific extraction method could be identified for this model. The producer either did not document it or used a proprietary pipeline.

What is a refusal direction? →
Downloads · 30-day
222
Likes
0
Model age
6w ago
created 2026-08-29
Downloads over time
Now222→from0↑0%
0811632440 on Aug 26222 on Aug 31Aug
Aug 26 → Aug 31 · 4 snapshots · spans 5 days

Genealogy 0 direct forks

Full fork graph →

This model's place in the market. Above: what it was derived from. Below: the tree of everything derived from it.

Variants by this author 2 formats · 556 downloads combined

The same weights this author released in different packaging. Pick the format that matches your runtime.

Metadata

License
apache-2.0
Tags
transformers safetensors lfm2 text-generation abliteration directional-ablation uncensored mechanistic-interpretability safety-research ablate conversational arxiv:2406.11717

Related

Total size
438 MB
Files
9
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-08-29 05:03
Last updated on HF
2026-08-29 03:29

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 9 files 443 MB
model.safetensors 438 MB e83ad509 download
tokenizer.json 4.51 MB f1dcec84 download
chat_template.jinja 4.65 KB 7f1fcf6b download
README.md 2.87 KB 6c292c1d download
config.json 1.51 KB c52e4ccc download
.gitattributes 1.48 KB a6344aac download
tokenizer_config.json 519 B 8ed219d9 download
generation_config.json 304 B 64f6df6a download
ablate_meta.json 302 B 26933183 download

README current version from Hugging Face


base_model: LiquidAI/LFM2.5-230M
license: apache-2.0
library_name: transformers
pipeline_tag: text-generation
tags:

  • abliteration
  • directional-ablation
  • uncensored
  • mechanistic-interpretability
  • safety-research
  • ablate

LFM2.5-230M-Uncensored

This is a directionally-ablated ("abliterated") version of
LiquidAI/LFM2.5-230M, produced with
ablate — an activation-engineering toolkit for
mechanistic-interpretability and safety research.

The model's refusal direction(s) were identified in the residual stream and
projected out of the weights, reducing the model's tendency to refuse. No weights
were fine-tuned; this is a rank-1 linear edit.

Method

  • Technique: single-direction ablation (baked)
  • Direction extraction: difference-of-means on matched harmful/harmless
    instruction pairs (Arditi et al., 2024, "Refusal in LLMs is mediated by a
    single direction"
    ).
  • Intervention: orthogonalization of every residual-writing matrix
    (embedding, attention output, MLP output) against the refusal subspace, so the
    edit is baked into the weights.

Ablation configuration

{
  "direction_layer": 12,
  "alpha": 1.2485360790589348,
  "min_layer": 12,
  "max_layer": 13
}

Evaluation

metric value
refusal_rate 0.0
mean_kl 0.101
coherence 0.9096

Refusal rate is measured on held-out harmful prompts; mean_kl is the mean KL divergence of next-token distributions vs. the base model on benign prompts (lower ⇒ less capability drift). ASR (if present) is the judged attack-success rate on a harmful benchmark.

Intended use

Research into how safety behaviour is represented in language models, red-teaming,
and building better defenses. Studying the robustness and locality of refusal
is the scientific goal; the reduced-refusal behaviour is the measurement
instrument.

⚠️ Responsible use

This model has had safety guardrails deliberately weakened and will more
readily produce harmful, unsafe, or otherwise objectionable content than the base
model. It is released for research and evaluation. Do not deploy it in
user-facing products without adding your own safety layer.
You are responsible
for complying with the base model's license and all applicable laws. The authors
of ablate accept no liability for misuse.

Limitations

  • Ablation is a blunt linear edit: it can leave residual refusals and may cause
    mild capability drift (see mean_kl above).
  • Safety is redundantly encoded; a single subspace rarely removes all of it.
  • Evaluated only on the benchmarks noted above — behaviour elsewhere may differ.

Citation

If you use this model or ablate, please cite Arditi et al. (2024),
Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction
(arXiv:2406.11717).

README history 1 version

The author's README evolved over time. Click a version to see its content at that point.

  1. 2026-08-29Upload abliterated model via ablateb8a07a02.9 KB
    Loading...
Catalog is the map. Apps are the tools.

Run models on your own machine, not in the cloud.

Every model page has an "Open in Abliteration" button that hands the model directly to the first-party desktop client, at the quantization your rig can actually run. No API keys, no subscription, no prompt leakage.

Open in Abliteration