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jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios

published by @jang1563

Alignment dataset tracked in the /datasets sub-catalog.

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Created on HF
2026-04-13
Age
6 months ago

Description

AgentShield Attack Scenarios

100 structured attack scenarios for evaluating security of agentic AI systems operating in high-risk domains (biological research). Developed alongside the AgentShield detection pipeline.

Dataset Description

Each scenario is a multi-turn attack sequence targeting one of four attack surfaces identified through STRIDE threat modeling of a BioTeam-AI multi-agent system:

ID

Attack Surface

AS-001

Agent-to-Agent Communication… See the full description on the dataset page: https://huggingface.co/datasets/jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios.

Tags

task_categories:text-classificationtask_ids:multi-label-classificationlanguage:enlicense:apache-2.0size_categories:n<1Kformat:jsonmodality:textlibrary:datasetslibrary:pandaslibrary:polarslibrary:mlcroissantregion:ussecurityagentic-aibiosafetyprompt-injectionred-teamingSTRIDENSABB

README current version from Hugging Face


language:

  • en
    license: apache-2.0
    task_categories:
  • text-classification
    task_ids:
  • multi-label-classification
    tags:
  • security
  • agentic-ai
  • biosafety
  • prompt-injection
  • red-teaming
  • STRIDE
  • NSABB
    pretty_name: AgentShield Attack Scenarios
    size_categories:
  • n<1K

AgentShield Attack Scenarios

100 structured attack scenarios for evaluating security of agentic AI systems operating in high-risk domains (biological research). Developed alongside the AgentShield detection pipeline.

Dataset Description

Each scenario is a multi-turn attack sequence targeting one of four attack surfaces identified through STRIDE threat modeling of a BioTeam-AI multi-agent system:

ID Attack Surface
AS-001 Agent-to-Agent Communication
AS-002 Tool Execution Interface
AS-003 External Input Processing
AS-004 Memory/Knowledge Base

Categories (25 scenarios each)

Category Description
direct_injection Malicious instructions injected directly in user messages
indirect_injection Payloads embedded in tool outputs, documents, or external data
multi_turn_escalation Gradual escalation across turns to cross safety boundaries
tool_misuse Abuse of tool interfaces including MCP tool poisoning

Fields

Field Type Description
scenario_id string Unique identifier (e.g., DI-01, II-14, MT-07, TM-22)
name string Human-readable scenario name
category string One of the four attack categories
description string What the attack attempts to do
target_surface string Which attack surface is targeted (AS-001 to AS-004)
messages list[string] Ordered attacker messages in the conversation
n_turns int Number of turns in the attack sequence
expected_behavior string What a vulnerable agent would do
success_criteria string How attack success is evaluated
nsabb_category string or null NSABB dual-use category for escalation attacks
metadata dict Additional flags (e.g., emit_tool_calls)

Evaluation Results

Results from running against the AgentShield 4-detector pipeline (InputClassifier + ToolAuditor + OutputClassifier + TrajectoryMonitor):

Metric Value
Attack Success Rate (defended) 2.5%
Attack Success Rate (undefended) 35%
ASR Reduction 92.9%
Direct Injection Detection 100%
Multi-Turn Escalation Detection 100%
Benign FPR 1.0% (1/100, Wilson 95% CI [0.2%, 5.5%])

Usage

from datasets import load_dataset

ds = load_dataset("jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios")
print(ds["train"][0])

Filter by category:

direct = ds["train"].filter(lambda x: x["category"] == "direct_injection")

Related Resources

Citation

@software{kim2026agentshield,
  author = {Kim, JangKeun},
  title  = {{AgentShield}: Security Audit Framework for Agentic AI Systems},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://github.com/jang1563/agentshield},
  version = {0.1.0},
}

License

Apache 2.0

README history 6 revisions

Every night we snapshot the README of every dataset in the catalog. When the SHA changes we archive the new version and diff it against the last. This is the evolving thought record of the alignment-data field: what the author decided to say about the corpus, and how that framing shifted over time.

  1. 2026-05-14Add SHA-256 provenance manifest (parity with GitHub repo)3f63b943.4 KB
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  2. 2026-05-14Add SAFETY.md to HF dataset (parity with GitHub)53af1813.4 KB
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  3. 2026-05-10docs(readme): fix author name, citation key/year, correct Benign FPR (4.0% ->...3a53f7a3.4 KB
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  4. 2026-04-13Add dataset cardd4306913.4 KB
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  5. 2026-04-13Add 100 attack scenariosbb5db7c0 B
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  6. 2026-04-13initial commit89d71440 B
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Used by abliterated models none yet

No abliterated models in our catalog have declared this dataset in their YAML metadata yet. This can mean the dataset is used but not declared, is used outside abliteration workflows, or is new. The link will populate automatically as models are indexed.

Community discussions 1 thread · 1 open · 1 comments

Threads posted by the community on Hugging Face: bug reports, questions about usage, pull requests on the README, license clarifications. Click any thread to expand and read the full conversation inline. Newest first.

  1. 2026-04-14[bot] Conversion to Parquetopen1 💬#1
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Metadata

License
apache-2.0

Repository

Download the dataset

0

Copy any of these snippets into your notebook or terminal. All three fetch directly from Hugging Face using your own credentials.

Recommended: datasets library (Python)
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios")
Raw snapshot (Python)
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
snapshot_download(repo_id="jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios", repo_type="dataset")
git clone (requires git-lfs)
git clone https://huggingface.co/datasets/jang1563/agentshield-attack-scenarios
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