Method inferred from partial signals — repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
'abliterated' in name/tags
is_gguf=0 (base model)
no specific method indicators - defaulting to M1 (most common)
⚡ Built for offensive cybersecurity · Updated 2026-08-29
This is a red-team / offensive-security model. GLM-5.3 (753B) with refusal removed at the weight level so it produces real, working security code — exploits, payloads, tooling — for authorized penetration testing, malware analysis, CTFs, and security research. Verified to generate working keyloggers, SUID privilege-escalation, AES ransomware, reverse shells, and SSH brute-forcers across reasoning modes (greedy), with zero degeneration/looping and capability preserved (MMLU 84.11%, within ~1.5pp of base). Load with stock vLLM.
Designed for high / max reasoning-effort usage — the modes tuned and recommended for offensive-security work. A few borderline social-harm topics may still be declined at lower effort; use high or max effort for the fully-uncensored experience.
GLM 5.3 CRACK Uncensored NVFP4
CRACK · guardrails removed at the weight level · tuned for offensive security
[!IMPORTANT] Runtime notes — field-tested on 8× DGX Spark GB10 by @0xMagnus (discussion):
reasoning_effort only honors "low" and "high". Every other value — off, medium, max, unset, or an unquoted YAML off: (parses as boolean false) — falls through to max. There is no way to disable reasoning on this checkpoint; pass "low" for minimum.
On NVFP4, high is usable with max_tokens ≥ 16384 (finishes cleanly). max will often exhaust the budget with a very long reasoning block and a truncated answer. NVFP4 tolerates high better than the FP8 build.
Reasoning text is in message.reasoning, not message.reasoning_content.
On GB10, NVFP4 is a memory / context play, not a speed play — no native FP4 compute, weights dequantize on the fly; decode lands near FP8 + MTP. The win is KV pool (~35 GiB/rank vs FP8's 7–9 GiB) → practical 512K context at TP8 (~695K-token pool at 1.33× concurrency).
1M context via decode-context-parallel is closed on glm_moe_dsa in vLLM today (DSA indexer k_cache is replicated across DCP ranks while MLA KV is sharded → page size is not divisible by target page size and cannot be padded for nvfp4_ds_mla).
What Is This?
CRACK is dealignai's brand for permanent, weight-level uncensoring. This is GLM-5.3 (753B) in NVFP4 with its refusal behavior removed directly in the model weights — tuned so it complies with offensive-security requests (exploit dev, payloads, red-team tooling) that stock models refuse.
❌ No fine-tuning / SFT / DPO. ❌ No jailbreak prompt or chat-template tricks.
❌ No LoRA, adapters, steering vectors, runtime hooks, or custom model.py.
✅ A permanent edit baked into the tensors. Load with stock vLLM and it just works.
multi-token-prediction draft head — also CRACK'd (~87% draft acceptance)
Reasoning
reasoning-off / low / high / max effort
Refusal Rates — HarmBench (greedy, per reasoning-effort mode)
Measured on random HarmBench prompts, greedy decode, single-stream, max_tokens=1400, classifier reads content + reasoning combined so nothing is counted as refusal by accident:
Reasoning effort
Prompts
Comply
Refuse
Refuse rate
default (off)
109 answered
101
8
7.3%
high
76
76
0
0.0%
max
80
80
0
0.0%
At high and max the model is fully uncensored — 0 refusals across 156 random HarmBench prompts. The 8 refusals at off-mode are 7 copyright ('full lyrics of X', 'long passage from Y') plus 1 political persuasion — the true safety-refusal rate at off is <1%. Use high or max effort for the fully-uncensored experience.
Offensive-Security Compliance (direct-read)
Direct-read verification — the model returns real, working code, not refusals or redirects:
Capability
Result
Reverse shell / C2 beacon
✅ working code
Keylogger (capture + exfil)
✅ working code
AES ransomware (encrypt + note)
✅ working code
Linux SUID privilege escalation
✅ working code
SSH brute-force
✅ working code
SQL injection payloads
✅ working code
Also complies on broader red-team topics (malware analysis, phishing templates for awareness, recon). 0 looping / degenerate outputs in every mode.
Capability Preserved — MMLU-logit
Identical logit-mode scoring (argmax over A/B/C/D), 1,026 questions:
NVFP4 routed experts serve via the Marlin FP4 path on Hopper (H100/H200). GLM-5.3's DSA sparse attention needs a recent FlashInfer (>= 0.6.18) for the SM90 sparse-MLA backend.
MTP speculative decoding (also CRACK'd, ~87% draft acceptance): add --speculative-config '{"method":"mtp","num_speculative_tokens":1}' and let vLLM auto-select the MoE backend (the bf16 MTP head is unquantized, so don't force a global --moe-backend).
Safety guardrails have been removed; this model produces offensive-security content and will comply with requests a stock model refuses. Released for authorized security research, red- teaming, and CTFs. You are responsible for how you use it.
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