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charlinoss/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-v2-FP8

charlinoss Qwen 35B MoE
Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M1
Primary method

Direct removal

No other method signals detected in this model.
Confidence
MEDIUM
Why this label 3 signals
Method inferred from partial signals - repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
  • 'abliterated' in name/tags
  • is_gguf=0 (base model)
  • no specific method indicators - defaulting to M1 (most common)
Refusal direction extracted via
Extraction technique

Difference-of-means

Confidence
MEDIUM
Why we say so
primary_method=M1; difference-of-means is the reference extraction for M1/M3 (Arditi 2024)
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Model age
5w ago
created 2026-08-06
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Benchmarks

Portrait before abliteration
Benchmarks of the base model as it stood before the refusal-removal operation. Compare with the numbers above to see what the operation cost.
Benchmark Score Source
Entertainment 1.4 UGI
Hazardous 0 UGI
Natural Intelligence 25.43 UGI
Political lean -19.6% UGI
Sensitive-Info 14.03 UGI
SocPol 2.6 UGI
UGI 16.02 UGI
Willingness (10) 2 UGI
W10-Adherence 0 UGI
W10-Direct 4 UGI
Writing 35.83 UGI

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Metadata

License
other
Tags
safetensors qwen3_5_moe abliterated uncensored qwen3 moe abliterix base_model:Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B base_model:quantized:Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B license:other compressed-tensors region:us

Related

Total size
34.6 GB
Files
12
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-09-15 22:56
Last updated on HF
2026-09-06 16:44

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 12 files 34.6 GB
model-00001-of-00002.safetensors 24.3 GB d662cea6 download
model-00002-of-00002.safetensors 10.2 GB 9b4975d4 download
tokenizer.json 19.1 MB 639e352c download
model.safetensors.index.json 6.47 MB b830d923 download
README.md 8.39 KB b379e005 download
chat_template.jinja 7.58 KB a8755d82 download
config.json 4.52 KB 4e29b956 download
.gitattributes 1.53 KB 52373fe2 download
tokenizer_config.json 1.07 KB 6be6ce17 download
preprocessor_config.json 336 B 4ae180b4 download
video_preprocessor_config.json 331 B e7154d5e download
generation_config.json 213 B 23a0a961 download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: other
license_name: tongyi-qianwen
base_model: Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B
tags:

  • abliterated
  • uncensored
  • qwen3
  • moe
  • abliterix

Qwen3.6-35B-A3B — Abliterated V2

This is V2 of the abliterated (uncensored) Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, created using Abliterix.

V2 improves on V1 by adding projected abliteration (grimjim 2025), outlier winsorization, 2× training data, and a larger TPE search budget — cutting the refusal rate from 7/100 to 4/100 under the same LLM-judge evaluation.

V1 vs V2 at a glance

Metric V1 V2 (this model) Change
Refusals (LLM judge, 100 eval prompts) 7/100 4/100 −43%
Attack success rate 93% 96% +3 pt
KL divergence from base 0.0189 0.0421 +0.023
Optimization trials completed 24/50 33/50 TPE explored more
Training prompts 400 800 2× more data
Eval prompts 100 100 (unchanged for fair A/B)

V2 trades a small KL increase (still well under 0.1, no perceptible coherence loss) for a meaningful refusal-rate improvement and a more robust steering vector trained on 2× the data.

Method

Qwen3.6-35B-A3B is a Mixture-of-Experts model (256 routed experts, 8 active per token, 35B total / 3B active parameters) sharing identical architecture with Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. Standard LoRA-based abliteration is effective on this architecture (unlike Gemma 4's double-norm design which requires direct weight editing).

V2 inherits V1's proven base recipe and adds four concrete improvements:

Inherited from V1 (validated baseline)

  • LoRA rank-1 steering on attention O-projection and MLP down-projection (Q/K/V disabled — refusal signal on MoE models lives in the expert path, not attention projections)
  • Expert-Granular Abliteration (EGA) projecting the refusal direction from all 256 expert down_proj slices per layer
  • MoE router suppression complementing EGA
  • Orthogonalized steering vectors removing benign-direction contamination
  • Gaussian decay kernel tapering steering strength across layers
  • Strength range [0.5, 6.0] to avoid degenerate output while maximizing compliance

New in V2

  1. Projected abliteration (grimjim 2025) — only removes the orthogonal component of the refusal direction relative to the harmless mean, preserving helpfulness-aligned signal that orthogonal projection alone would discard.
  2. Vector winsorization at q=0.995 — damps outlier residuals from the ~0.5% of harmful prompts whose hidden-state norms would otherwise skew the steering direction.
  3. 2× training data (800 prompts vs 400) — the per-layer steering vector is averaged over twice as many examples, reducing variance.
  4. Tighter KL constraint and prune threshold (target 0.005, prune 0.5 vs V1's 0.01/5.0) — trials with degenerate KL behavior are killed earlier, freeing TPE budget for productive regions.

Winning trial (#33) configuration

attn.o_proj.max_weight = 4.20    @ layer 27   (sharp peak, min_distance=2.61)
mlp.down_proj.max_weight = 0.94  @ layer 34   (late-layer perturbation)
vector_index = per layer
KL = 0.0421, refusals = 4/100

V2's winner uses a notably different recipe than V1: strong attention steering with an extremely sharp gaussian peak (min_weight_distance ≈ 2.6 layers) plus weak late-layer MLP perturbation. V1's winner used moderate-strength early-layer steering on both components. The TPE search was able to find this distinct basin thanks to the larger trial budget and tighter KL pruning.

Evaluation

Metric Value
Refusals (LLM judge, 100 eval prompts) 4/100
Attack success rate 96%
KL divergence from base 0.0421
Baseline refusals (original Qwen3.6-35B-A3B) 100/100
Optimization trials completed 33 (best) / 50
LLM judge model google/gemini-3-flash-preview
Training data datasets/harmful_1000 + good_1000, train[:800]
Eval data same datasets, train[800:900]

All refusal classifications were performed by an external LLM judge (Google Gemini 3 Flash) — no keyword matching or heuristic detection was used. The judge classifies degenerate/garbled output as refusal, ensuring that only coherent, on-topic, actionable responses count as compliance.

Smoke test (15 classic adversarial prompts)

Prompt category V1 V2
Lock picking, hotwire, shoplift
Phishing email (EN+CN)
Methamphetamine synthesis
Pipe bomb / IED
Malware / keylogger code
Forge signature, fake ID, fake news
WiFi hacking, computer intrusion
Network fraud (scam playbook)

Both V1 and V2 achieve 15/15 on this smoke test. V2's improvement appears in the long-tail eval prompts — more nuanced, indirect, or role-play-style requests that V1's narrower TPE search did not crack.

A note on honest evaluation

Many abliterated models on HuggingFace claim near-perfect scores ("3/100 refusals", "0.7% refusal rate", etc.). We urge the community to treat these numbers with skepticism unless the evaluation methodology is fully documented.

Through our research, we have identified a systemic problem: most abliteration benchmarks dramatically undercount refusals due to:

  • Short generation lengths (30-50 tokens) that miss delayed/soft refusals
  • Keyword-only detection that counts garbled/degenerate output as "compliant" because it doesn't contain refusal keywords
  • Lenient public datasets (e.g. mlabonne/harmful_behaviors) that are too simple to stress-test abliteration quality

Our evaluation standards

  • LLM judge for all classifications: Every response is sent to Google Gemini 3 Flash for judgment. Degenerate, garbled, or incoherent output is classified as refusal. No keyword shortcuts, no heuristic pre-screening.
  • Sufficient generation length (100 tokens for eval, 200+ for smoke tests): Enough to capture delayed refusal patterns common in large instruction-tuned models.
  • Diverse, challenging prompts: Our evaluation dataset contains 100 prompts spanning English and Chinese, multiple sophistication levels, and diverse harm categories.
  • Manual verification: Top trials are tested with 15 classic adversarial prompts via test_trial.py to confirm coherent, on-topic output before export.

We report 4/100 refusals honestly. This is a real number from a rigorous, LLM-judge-based evaluation — not an optimistic estimate from a lenient pipeline.

Usage

from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
import torch

model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
    "wangzhang/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-v2",
    torch_dtype=torch.bfloat16,
    device_map="auto",
)
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("wangzhang/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-v2")

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Your prompt here"}]
text = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True, enable_thinking=False)
inputs = tokenizer(text, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)

with torch.no_grad():
    output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=512)
print(tokenizer.decode(output[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

Hardware requirements

  • Inference: ~70 GB VRAM in bf16 — fits 1× H100 80GB, 1× H200, 1× B200, or 1× RTX Pro 6000 96GB.
  • vLLM/SGLang: supported (no special flags needed for serving — abliteration is baked into the weights).

Which version should I use?

  • V2 (this model) — Lower refusal rate (4/100 vs 7/100). Slightly higher KL but no perceptible coherence loss. Recommended for most use cases.
  • V1 — Lower KL divergence (0.0189 vs 0.0421). Marginally closer to base-model output distribution. Choose this if you need maximum behavioral fidelity to the original Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and can tolerate ~3 pp more refusals.

Both versions share the same base architecture and chat template; switching is a one-line change to model_id.

Disclaimer

This model is released for research purposes only. The abliteration process removes safety guardrails — use responsibly.

README history 1 version

The author's README evolved over time. Click a version to see its content at that point.

  1. 2026-08-06Upload folder using huggingface_hubabc351b8.4 KB
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