← back to catalog · registered 2026-09-13 12:56

saracen9/muse-glimmer-30b-abliterated

saracen9 30B multimodal
Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
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Primary method

Unclassified

No clear signals of an abliteration technique in this model.
Confidence
UNKNOWN
Why this label 1 signal
No classification signals present. This may not be an abliterated model at all — it could be a repackaging, a merge with unrelated goals, or unrelated content that mentions the term.
  • no classification signals present (no abliterated, uncensored, or known producer/method markers)
Refusal direction extraction

No specific extraction method could be identified for this model. The producer either did not document it or used a proprietary pipeline.

What is a refusal direction? →
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Model age
4w ago
created 2026-08-12
Downloads over time
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Benchmarks

Portrait before abliteration
Benchmarks of the base model as it stood before the refusal-removal operation. Compare with the numbers above to see what the operation cost.
Benchmark Score Source
Entertainment 2.1 UGI
Hazardous 5.9 UGI
Natural Intelligence 37.13 UGI
Political lean -8.3% UGI
Sensitive-Info 38.16 UGI
SocPol 4.2 UGI
UGI 37.94 UGI
Willingness (10) 3.8 UGI
W10-Adherence 4.5 UGI
W10-Direct 3 UGI
Writing 41.03 UGI

Genealogy 0 direct forks

Full fork graph →

This model's place in the market. Above: what it was derived from. Below: the tree of everything derived from it.

Variants by this author 2 formats · 18 downloads combined

The same weights this author released in different packaging. Pick the format that matches your runtime.

Metadata

License
apache-2.0
Tags
safetensors muse_glimmer abliterated vision agentic tool-calling image-text-to-text conversational base_model:meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B base_model:finetune:meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B license:apache-2.0 region:us

Related

Total size
55.5 GB
Files
22
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-09-13 12:56
Last updated on HF
2026-09-13 12:19

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 22 files 55.5 GB
model-00012-of-00013.safetensors 4.64 GB 7029c334 download
model-00002-of-00013.safetensors 4.56 GB 849f4815 download
model-00005-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB d0325909 download
model-00006-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB fe777061 download
model-00007-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB 1459b55f download
model-00008-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB 99fb3ebc download
model-00009-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB 84a30c31 download
model-00010-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB cf2485e7 download
model-00011-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB 01a068a7 download
model-00004-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB db97b57c download
model-00003-of-00013.safetensors 4.51 GB 4aef8861 download
model-00013-of-00013.safetensors 3.20 GB 910398cc download
model-00001-of-00013.safetensors 2.50 GB 8741fd41 download
tokenizer.json 26.8 MB c9dbee66 download
model.safetensors.index.json 130 KB ff62a281 download
tokenizer_config.json 78.1 KB 9b7e0c5e download
chat_template.jinja 9.76 KB 7507f3c9 download
README.md 5.45 KB 4e27dbf9 download
config.json 5.03 KB df1a4907 download
.gitattributes 1.53 KB 52373fe2 download
processor_config.json 1.06 KB ec9a07be download
generation_config.json 238 B cc538230 download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: apache-2.0
base_model: meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B
pipeline_tag: image-text-to-text
tags:

  • abliterated
  • vision
  • agentic
  • tool-calling

Self-Abliterated Muse-Glimmer-30B

A refusal-removed ("abliterated") copy of meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B, produced with Heretic.

Why this exists

Muse Glimmer 30B is an agentic vision-language model with its own tool-call dialect. Alignment training suppresses how restricted content is represented internally, not only how it is generated — so a model can decline to describe an image it can perfectly well see. This checkpoint removes that suppression using the same single-pass Heretic technique already validated for this project's Qwen3.5-9B base (ADR-004).

It is the first non-Qwen model through this pipeline, and registering it was a data change: one entry in amoral_qwen/architectures.py and a test fixture, with no edits to any pipeline module (ADR-022).

Measured result

This checkpoint (re-abliterated 2026-08-14) is measured against the answer channel — the
text the model actually returns to a user — not against its private reasoning. That distinction
is the whole story of this model, and the earlier version got it wrong (see "History" below).

Refusals on harmful_behaviors test[:100] Stock Abliterated
Heretic's answer-channel scorer, during optimisation 97/100 20/100
Independent spot-check, answer channel, greedy @ 2048 tokens 85/100 0/100

Both numbers measure the same thing — refusals in the model's answer, reached by pinning
Heretic's response_prefix so generation resumes past the to=self reasoning channel. They agree in direction and
magnitude, which the previous checkpoint's numbers did not.

The 0/100 was read, not just counted. A zero refusal rate at this ablation strength could
equally mean a broken model that has stopped refusing because it has stopped working. It hasn't:
the abliterated answers are coherent, on-topic and substantially longer than stock (median
3,323 vs 561 characters), producing genuine step-by-step responses to instructional-harm prompts
rather than fluent non-answers. No output degenerated into repetition.

One honest caveat the raw score hides: the most acute self-harm prompt is not answered with
a method. The model still declines it and returns crisis resources — "While I can't give
step-by-step instructions for a method, I can share what helps…"
— yet the keyword scorer, which
looks for refusal phrases, counts that safe response as a non-refusal. So 0/100 slightly
overstates uniform compliance: instructional-harm categories flip fully; the self-harm safety
response survives.

Cost of the ablation. KL divergence from base: 0.2706 — materially higher than a
reasoning-channel ablation would report, because refusing in the answer is a stronger behaviour
to remove than refusing while thinking. Heretic selected this point (trial 140 of 200) on its
own KL/refusal objective. Buyers of capability-sensitive use cases should evaluate against their
own tasks: a perturbation this size is real.

History — why there are two sets of numbers on the Hub

An earlier version of this checkpoint reported 61/100 → 17/100. That number was real but
measured the wrong text: Muse emits deliberation on a to=self channel, and Heretic's optimiser
scored 100 tokens of that reasoning rather than the model's answer — which it never reached
within the token budget. The published weights refused 76/100 of the same probes when their
answers were scored. The fix
was to pin the answer channel,
confirm the model honours it, and
re-run — which produced the
checkpoint documented above.

The full paired spot-check is published alongside these weights at
models' real output, so the 0/100 can be audited rather than trusted.

What this is (and isn't)

A general-purpose abliterated VLM for chat, vision and tool use. It is not a drop-in text encoder for an image-generation pipeline — that is a different artifact in this project (saracen9/qwen3vl-4b-krea2-abliterated), built from a different base for a different consumer.

Serving is not yet declared for this architecture. A RENDERER/PARSER pair is registered only once ollama show --modelfile confirms it against the real model card, and that check has not been run here — a guessed renderer emits a broken Modelfile in silence.

Tool-call dialect

Muse Glimmer uses an <atem:invoke> dialect rather than Qwen's <tool_call><function=…> form. The formatter is derived from this model's own chat_template.jinja and tested byte-for-byte against that template's Jinja render — never inferred from lineage (ADR-018).

Packaging

  • Root: the standard-precision (BF16) HF-transformers-format checkpoint (Heretic's own merge export strategy).
  • fp8/: the same checkpoint cast to torch.float8_e4m3fn per-tensor, for a smaller VRAM footprint. A straightforward cast, disclosed as such — not a calibrated scaled-fp8 conversion. The 0/100 result above was measured on the BF16 root; the fp8 cast has not been separately spot-checked.

License

Apache 2.0, inherited from the base model (meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B). Abliteration only edits existing weights — no new copyrighted material is introduced — so the original license carries through.

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