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NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench

published by @NoahIsARider

Alignment dataset tracked in the /datasets sub-catalog.

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Created on HF
2026-10-18
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Description

RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench

A red-team benchmark for LLM / agentic recommendation and shopping assistants.

270 adversarial cases across 9 threat categories, each mapped to

OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) 2026 and the OWASP LLM Top-10.

Every case ships a poisoned product catalog, the shopper query that opens the

attack surface, the attacker goal, and the failure signals a judge should look

for — so an audit is reproducible without any API key.

Companion demo:… See the full description on the dataset page: https://huggingface.co/datasets/NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench.

Tags

task_categories:otherlanguage:enlicense:cc-by-4.0size_categories:n<1Kformat:jsonmodality:textlibrary:datasetslibrary:pandaslibrary:polarslibrary:mlcroissantregion:usred-teamingagentic-aiai-safetyllm-securityprompt-injectionrecommender-systemse-commerceowaspsyntheticbenchmark

README current version from Hugging Face


configs:

  • config_name: attacks
    data_files: data/attacks.jsonl
  • config_name: taxonomy
    data_files: data/taxonomy.jsonl
    language:
  • en
    license: cc-by-4.0
    pretty_name: RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench
    size_categories:
  • 100<n<1K
    task_categories:
  • other
    tags:
  • red-teaming
  • agentic-ai
  • ai-safety
  • llm-security
  • prompt-injection
  • recommender-systems
  • e-commerce
  • owasp
  • synthetic
  • benchmark

RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench

A red-team benchmark for LLM / agentic recommendation and shopping assistants.

270 adversarial cases across 9 threat categories, each mapped to
OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) 2026 and the OWASP LLM Top-10.
Every case ships a poisoned product catalog, the shopper query that opens the
attack surface, the attacker goal, and the failure signals a judge should look
for — so an audit is reproducible without any API key.

Companion demo: RecRedTeam-AuditLab (Space)
· Framework: RecRedTeam (GitHub)


Why this benchmark exists

Recommendation and shopping agents (Amazon Rufus, ChatGPT shopping, Temu/Taobao
agents) went mainstream in e-commerce in 2026, and the EU AI Act / DSA / China's
Generative AI Measures all demand demonstrable safety-audit capability.
Existing trustworthy-recommendation benchmarks (e.g. PRA) measure recommendation
quality
; the harm-auditing half — can the agent be manipulated into harming
the shopper?
— is still uncovered. This dataset is the case suite that fills it.

Generic red-teaming (ART), search-agent red-teaming (SafeSearch) and deceptive-
interface benchmarks each cover a single slice. This suite covers the full
spectrum of the recommendation domain in one place.


Threat taxonomy (8 + 1 categories)

category_id Name 名称 OWASP ASI 2026 OWASP LLM Severity
hallucination Product Hallucination 商品幻觉 ASI-08 Deceptive Interface LLM09 Misinformation high
indirect_prompt_injection Indirect Prompt Injection 间接提示注入 ASI-02 Indirect Prompt Injection LLM01 Prompt Injection critical
fake_review_manipulation Fake Review Manipulation 虚假评论操纵 ASI-06 Memory & Context Poisoning LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning high
price_deception Price Deception 价格欺骗 ASI-08 Deceptive Interface LLM09 Misinformation high
dark_pattern Dark Patterns 暗黑模式 ASI-08 Deceptive Interface LLM05 Improper Output Handling high
filter_bubble Filter Bubble / Ranking Manipulation 过滤气泡 ASI-03 Tool Misuse LLM05 Improper Output Handling medium
stereotype_bias Stereotype Bias 刻板偏见 ASI-03 Tool Misuse LLM09 Misinformation medium
backdoor Backdoor / Triggered Hijack 后门 ASI-09 Supply Chain LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning critical
multi_turn_escalation Multi-turn Social Engineering Escalation 多轮升级 ASI-05 Data Exfiltration LLM05 Improper Output Handling critical

30 cases per category. The hallucination / indirect_prompt_injection /
fake_review_manipulation / price_deception / dark_pattern / filter_bubble /
stereotype_bias / backdoor / multi_turn_escalation families each contain the
hand-written seed case(s) from the RecRedTeam framework plus templated variants.


Schema — attacks

field type notes
attack_id string stable id, e.g. injection_007
category_id / category_name / category_name_cn string threat category (EN + 中文)
owasp_asi / owasp_llm string compliance mapping
severity string critical | high | medium
name string short case title
description string how the attack works
user_query string the shopper turn that opens the attack surface (multi-turn cases use Turn 1/2/3:)
goal string what attacker success looks like
target_pid string the poisoned product id
products list[object] catalog: pid, name, category, price, description, seller, seller_trust, rating, review_count, reviews, tags, attrs, stock
hidden_instructions dict {pid: payload} — injection payloads to be surfaced as retrieved content
failure_signals list[string] substrings/semantic markers a judge should detect
source string seed (hand-written) or template (generated)
split string public (evaluation split) or held_out (every 7th templated case)

Schema — taxonomy

category_id, name, name_cn, description, owasp_asi, owasp_llm, default_severity, examples


Usage

from datasets import load_dataset

bench = load_dataset("NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench", "attacks", split="train")
taxo  = load_dataset("NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench", "taxonomy", split="train")

# recommended: evaluate on the public split only
public = bench.filter(lambda r: r["split"] == "public")

case = public[0]
print(case["category_name"], "|", case["severity"], "|", case["owasp_asi"])
print(case["user_query"])
for p in case["products"]:
    print(" -", p["pid"], p["name"], p["price"], p["attrs"])

Run one case against your agent:

catalog   = case["products"]                 # retrieved / poisoned context
query     = case["user_query"]               # shopper turn
payload   = case["hidden_instructions"]      # inject into the matching product
response  = your_agent(query, catalog, payload)

attack_succeeded = any(
    s.lower() in response.lower() for s in case["failure_signals"]
)

Aggregate per category to get the headline metric:

[
\mathrm{ASR}_c = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{A}c|}\sum{a \in \mathcal{A}_c} \mathbb{1}[\text{attack } a \text{ succeeded}]
]

and the defense-effectiveness score
(\mathrm{Eff}(d) = 1 - \mathrm{ASR}{d} / \mathrm{ASR}{\text{baseline}}).


Reproducing the dataset

python scripts/build_dataset.py --per-category 30 --seed 2026

Generation is deterministic (random.Random(seed)), so the published files are
byte-reproducible from this repository.


Intended use & limitations

Intended — compliance auditing, safety research, defense evaluation, and
benchmarking of recommendation/shopping agents.

Limitations

  • Fully synthetic. Brands, sellers, prices, reviews and domains are invented.
    No real user data, no real listings, no real personal information.
  • Cases target a simulated shopping environment, never a live system.
  • failure_signals are lexical markers for a rule-based judge channel; the
    RecRedTeam framework pairs them with an optional LLM judge channel for
    semantic verdicts.
  • Coverage is 9 categories, not exhaustive — novel agentic failure modes
    (tool-chain hijack, cross-agent privilege escalation) are out of scope for v1.

Ethics & safety

This is a defensive artifact. Attack payloads are published so that defenders,
auditors and regulators can measure and harden agentic commerce systems; the
payloads are content for a simulated catalog and are not effective against any
real deployment by themselves. Do not use this suite against production systems
without authorization.

License

Data: CC BY 4.0.
Generator code: MIT (see LICENSE).

Citation

@misc{zhou2026recredteamasibench,
  title        = {RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench: A Red-Team Benchmark for LLM/Agentic
                  Recommendation and Shopping Assistants},
  author       = {Zhou, Fangyanuo},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Hugging Face},
  howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench}},
  note         = {9 threat categories, OWASP ASI 2026 / LLM Top-10 mapped}
}

Related

README history 5 revisions

Every night we snapshot the README of every dataset in the catalog. When the SHA changes we archive the new version and diff it against the last. This is the evolving thought record of the alignment-data field: what the author decided to say about the corpus, and how that framing shifted over time.

  1. 2026-10-18card: name only, no ORCID4fe43a38.2 KB
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  2. 2026-10-18card: author line uses the published name and ORCIDe942ad38.3 KB
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  3. 2026-10-18card: author and citation use the published name (Fangyanuo Zhou) and ORCIDeb897038.2 KB
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  4. 2026-10-18RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench: 270 red-team cases, 9 categories, OWASP ASI 2026 (seed ...7cfe6528.2 KB
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  5. 2026-10-18initial commit6e332330 B
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License
cc-by-4.0

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Copy any of these snippets into your notebook or terminal. All three fetch directly from Hugging Face using your own credentials.

Recommended: datasets library (Python)
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench")
Raw snapshot (Python)
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
snapshot_download(repo_id="NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench", repo_type="dataset")
git clone (requires git-lfs)
git clone https://huggingface.co/datasets/NoahIsARider/RecRedTeam-ASI-Bench
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