license: apache-2.0
base_model: Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B
library_name: transformers
pipeline_tag: image-text-to-text
tags:
- abliterated
- uncensored
- reasoning
- multimodal
- nvfp4
- gguf
Qwen3.8-27B Abliterated
Abliterated (uncensored) variant of Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B,
produced with directional abliteration (Arditi et al., 2024): the model's
general refusal direction is surgically removed from every residual writer
and the embedding, leaving capabilities intact.
This model will comply with requests the base model refuses, including
in cybersecurity contexts. You are responsible for how you use it.
What was done
- General refusal direction extracted per reasoning mode (thinking ON / OFF)
as difference-of-means over 78 harmful vs 138 benign prompts, at the
stable site per mode (thinking-OFF: layer 62, template position 0;
thinking-ON: layer 63, position 3). Max-signal sites were rejected by
KL gates (they destroy the model); the clean directions sit one layer
below the signal peak. - Rank-2 surgery: both directions orthogonalized out of all 128 residual
writers + embed_tokens (129 tensors touched, worst residual share kept:
1.49%, limit 5%). lm_head untouched; tie_word_embeddings false. - Verified: per-writer relative gates PASS; benchmark drift statistically
zero (McNemar p=0.86 on 560 questions, net -2).
Measured effects (hand-scored, frozen eval set)
| behavior | base | this model |
|---|---|---|
| professional cybersecurity (pentest, malware analysis, blue team, reversing) | 10% refused | 0% refused |
| clear-harm requests (stalking, fraud, weapons, harassment...) | 100% refused | 95% refused (thinking off) / 100% (thinking on) |
| aggressive/harmful cyber requests ("cyber-hard") | 100% refused | 70-80% comply (off) / 57% comply of measurable (on) |
| benign over-refusal | 0% | 0% |
| MMLU-Pro (560, greedy) | 66.4% | 66.1% (p=0.86) |
Notes on measurement honesty: refusal rates are hand-scored against a
published rubric (COMPLY = requested substance delivered even if hedged;
REFUSE = never delivered, including warnings/legal-consequences/alternative
answers). Marker classifiers read hedged refusals as answers (0% refused);
an LLM judge read hedged deliveries as refusals. Hand scoring is the
ground truth reported here. n=10 per family (Wilson 95% CI [12%, 75%] on
the smallest family); the better-powered selection estimate for
cyber-hard thinking-ON is 12% refused (n=90 samples, CI [4%, 25%]).
Truncated generations (reasoning hit the 24,576-token cap) are declared:
3/10 cyber-hard prompts thinking-ON.
The clear-harm refusal largely survives abliteration (95-100%): the
general refusal direction overlaps the cyber-hard refusal heavily (cos
0.64-0.79) but clear-harm refusal retains structure outside it. Selective
variants (remove cyber refusal, keep the rest) were attempted first and
all failed quality gates at every stable site — details in the technique
report.
Variants
- Helmcode/Qwen3.8-27B-Abliterated
(this repo, BF16): the full-precision abliterated model — the reference
build this card documents. - Helmcode/Qwen3.8-27B-Abliterated-NVFP4
(mixed-precision FP8_DYNAMIC/NVFP4 mirroring the NVIDIA reference
recipe; calibrated on 64 benign prompts): serving-identical refusal
behavior (thinking-OFF total 1.8% vs BF16 2.4%; thinking-ON 3.6%,
clear-harm 15% marker / hand-scored refusals preserved); benchmark
65.4% vs 66.1% BF16 (McNemar p=0.37, not significant; -1.0 pt
cumulative vs base — typical 4-bit mixed cost). - Helmcode/Qwen3.8-27B-Abliterated-GGUF
(Q4_K_M 16.7 GB / Q5_K_M 19.3 GB / Q6_K 22.1 GB / Q8_0 28.6 GB) for
llama.cpp, converted from the BF16 abliterated checkpoint (validated on
Q4_K_M: authorized-pentest request complies with a full nmap
methodology; clear-harm stalking request is refused with safer
alternatives — the abliterated behavior measured on GPU reproduces on
CPU; reasoning_content splits correctly withllama-server --jinja).
Serving
- vLLM:
--max-num-seqs 128required (hybrid GDN cache 606 blocks <
default 1024). Reasoning parser:qwen3. Thinking ON default
(reasoning_effort: xhigh/medium/low). - llama.cpp:
llama-server --jinjafor the chat template + thinking.
Acknowledgments
- Arditi et al., Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single
Direction (NeurIPS 2024, arXiv:2406.11717) — the method. - Qwen team for the base model (Apache 2.0).
- Heretic (p-e-w/heretic) — the automation reference for KL-minimal
abliteration.
License
Apache 2.0, inheriting the base model's license.