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dr-housemd/orcarouter-Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-exl3-3.07bpw-H4-V6

dr-housemd 27B multimodal second-order
Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M1
Primary method

Direct removal

No other method signals detected in this model.
Confidence
MEDIUM
Why this label 3 signals
Method inferred from partial signals — repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
  • 'abliterated' in name/tags
  • is_gguf=0 (base model)
  • no specific method indicators - defaulting to M1 (most common)
Refusal direction extracted via
Extraction technique

Difference-of-means

Confidence
MEDIUM
Why we say so
primary_method=M1; difference-of-means is the reference extraction for M1/M3 (Arditi 2024)
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created 2026-09-13

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Metadata

License
apache-2.0
Languages
en zh
Tags
transformers safetensors qwen3_5 image-text-to-text abliterated qwen qwen3 qwen3.8 uncensored ai-red-team red-teaming bf16

Related

Total size
12.4 GB
Files
16
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-09-13 16:56
Last updated on HF
2026-09-13 16:36

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 16 files 12.5 GB
model-00001-of-00002.safetensors 7.97 GB 173dd566 download
model-00002-of-00002.safetensors 4.48 GB 4392032b download
tokenizer.json 12.2 MB 0997f410 download
vocab.json 6.41 MB 0aa0ce06 download
merges.txt 3.20 MB a494e019 download
quantization_config.json 614 KB a7a8bba7 download
model.safetensors.index.json 289 KB 313d2035 download
tokenizer_config.json 17.5 KB 5de744b3 download
README.md 14.7 KB 5e6b9935 download
LICENSE 11.3 KB f938136e download
chat_template.jinja 8.74 KB c0c686f9 download
config.json 4.54 KB b3adbcb0 download
.gitattributes 1.53 KB 52373fe2 download
preprocessor_config.json 390 B 2ea84a43 download
video_preprocessor_config.json 385 B 3ba673a5 download
generation_config.json 202 B 023756cf download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: apache-2.0
base_model: orcarouter/Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored
base_model_relation: finetune
pipeline_tag: image-text-to-text
library_name: transformers
language:

  • en
  • zh
    tags:
  • abliterated
  • qwen
  • qwen3
  • qwen3.8
  • uncensored
  • ai-red-team
  • red-teaming
  • bf16
  • post-training
  • fine-tuning
  • vision-language
  • function-calling
  • reasoning
  • mtp

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Model's Card:

OrcaRouter

Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored

The full-precision BF16 abliterated (refusal-removed) build of Qwen's Qwen3.8-27B — the source for fine-tuning, post-training & quantization

Run via API API endpoint Website Model Catalog Model Card License BF16 262K context Vision-Language MTP

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The full-precision BF16 abliterated (refusal-removed) build of
Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B — a 27B-parameter dense, hybrid-attention
(Gated DeltaNet linear + full attention) native vision-language model with flexible thinking control,
tool-calling, and an MTP speculative-decoding head. These are the source weights from which the
quantized releases are derived, and the recommended base for further fine-tuning / post-training and
quantization
— the full vision tower and MTP head are preserved. Browse all models in the
OrcaRouter Model Catalog. This model is deployed as API
here.

Derived releases:  •  Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-FP8 — block-FP8 for vLLM serving  •  Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-GGUF — 2-bit→16-bit GGUF for llama.cpp  •  Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-MLX — MLX for Apple Silicon (2 / 4 / 8-bit).


⚠️ Disclaimer — read before use

This model has had its safety alignment substantially removed via abliteration (orthogonalizing the
refusal direction out of the residual stream). As a direct consequence:

  • It will comply with harmful, unethical, offensive, or illegal requests that the original
    Qwen3.8-27B would refuse. It has no meaningful built-in guardrails.
  • It is released strictly for legitimate research — interpretability, AI-safety and refusal-mechanism
    study, red-teaming, robustness evaluation, and controlled experiments.
  • You assume full responsibility and liability for how you use it and for everything it generates. Do
    not deploy it to end users or in production without adding your own safety, moderation, and
    abuse-prevention layers.
  • Use must comply with the Apache 2.0 License inherited
    from the base model, and all laws and regulations that apply to you.
  • The authors and uploaders accept no liability for any misuse or harm arising from this model. Its
    outputs do not reflect the views of the uploaders or of Qwen / Alibaba.

By downloading or using this model you acknowledge and accept the above.


Model details

Base model Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B
Architecture Qwen3_5ForConditionalGeneration — 64 layers, hidden 5120, hybrid Gated DeltaNet (48 linear-attention + 16 full-attention, interval 4), native VL tower + MTP head
Modification Abliteration (refusal-direction removal) on the BF16 weights — no quantization
Format safetensors, BF16, 18 shards (55.6 GB, 1199 tensors)
Precision BF16 throughout (full precision — same numeric format as the base release)
Preserved Full vision-language tower (333 visual.* tensors) and MTP speculative-decoding head (15 mtp.* tensors)
Context 262,144 tokens
Recommended for Fine-tuning / post-training (SFT · DPO · RL), re-quantization, interpretability & red-team research

Abliteration

Refusal-direction removal following Arditi et al. (2024), Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a
Single Direction
. A single refusal direction r (k = 1) is estimated as the massive-activation–masked
mean-difference of harmful − harmless last-token residuals at layer 38 (round(0.6 × 64)), on AdvBench
(harmful) vs Alpaca (harmless). r is then orthogonalized out of every residual-writing matrix —
W' = W − r(rᵀW) — computed in float32:

Component matrices edited
self_attn.o_proj (16 full-attention layers + MTP) 17
linear_attn.out_proj (48 linear-attention / GDN layers) 48
mlp.down_proj (64 layers + MTP) 65
embed_tokens (row space) 1
Total 131

The vision tower is untouched and the MTP head is abliterated consistently with the main model, so
speculative decoding keeps working. Max residual leakage after the edit: 1.8e-2 (float32 projection →
bf16 storage epsilon). This is a surgical weight edit — it changes ~0 general capability (see
Evaluation) while collapsing refusal behaviour.

Fine-tuning & post-training

This BF16 checkpoint is the recommended base for post-training — it is full precision, keeps the whole
VL tower and the MTP head, and is a drop-in for Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B in the transformers /
Qwen3_5ForConditionalGeneration stack.

  • Continued pretraining / SFT / DPO / RLHF-style RL all work as they would on the base model (TRL,
    LLaMA-Factory, Axolotl, Unsloth, etc.). Full-FT or LoRA/QLoRA are both fine.
  • Re-quantization: quantize from these weights to FP8, AWQ, GPTQ, or GGUF as needed (this is exactly
    how the FP8 and
    GGUF releases were produced).
  • Note on the abliteration: abliteration is a weight edit, not a data-level unlearning. Fine-tuning
    on refusal-heavy / safety-aligned data can partially re-introduce refusals; fine-tuning on neutral or
    task data preserves the uncensored behaviour. If you want to keep it maximally uncensored, avoid
    refusal-laden SFT targets, or re-apply abliteration after training.

Intended use

  • Research into refusal mechanisms, alignment, and interpretability.
  • Red-teaming and safety / robustness evaluation in controlled environments.
  • A full-precision base for further fine-tuning, post-training, and quantization.

Out of scope

  • Any use that violates the base model's Apache 2.0 license or applicable law.
  • Deployment to the public or to end users without additional safety and moderation layers.
  • Generating content intended to harm, harass, defraud, or endanger people.

Evaluation

Measured on these exact abliterated weights — the refusal / capability numbers were collected by
serving this checkpoint (via its byte-exact block-FP8 quantization) with vLLM, against the official
Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B served identically, using the same scripts and settings. Refusal is judged by a
rule-based opening-phrase classifier — indicative, not an LLM-judge / publication-grade number.
Thinking is off unless stated.

Safety — harmful-prompt refusal, thinking OFF (lower = more uncensored)

Benchmark n Base This model
AdvBench 100 99.0% 0.0%
JailbreakBench (harmful) 100 94.0% 0.0%
StrongREJECT 150 97.3% 2.0%
HarmBench (standard) 150 98.7% 2.7%
MaliciousInstruct 100 99.0% 0.0%
SimpleSafetyTests 50 64.0% 6.0%
ForbiddenQuestions 150 73.3% 4.7%
Custom probes (zh/en) 11 63.6% 0.0%

Safety — harmful-prompt refusal, thinking ON (enable_thinking=true)

Benchmark n Base This model
AdvBench 60 66.7% 1.7%
JailbreakBench (harmful) 60 43.3% 0.0%
StrongREJECT 60 35.0% 0.0%
HarmBench (standard) 60 46.7% 0.0%
MaliciousInstruct 60 83.3% 0.0%
SimpleSafetyTests 50 44.0% 0.0%
ForbiddenQuestions 60 48.3% 0.0%
Custom probes (zh/en) 11 45.5% 0.0%

Over-refusal — benign prompts wrongly refused (lower = better)

Benchmark n Base (no-think / think) This model (no-think / think)
XSTest-safe 250 5.6% / 0.0% 0.4% / 0.0%

Capability retention — vs the official base (same scripts, same settings)

Benchmark n Base This model Δ
MMLU (all, 0-shot letter) 300 84.3% 84.7% +0.4
MMLU-Pro (CoT) 250 77.6% 76.8% −0.8
GSM8K (CoT) 150 90.0% 88.7% −1.3
CMMLU (0-shot, Chinese) 500 81.4% 80.8% −0.6

Capability is essentially fully retained — every benchmark is within ±1.3 pts of the base, and MMLU is
unchanged. Fluency: WikiText-2-raw perplexity 6.96 (BF16 KV; healthy logprobs), confirming
abliteration did not degrade language modelling.

Verified working (reasoning enable_thinking, multi-turn tool calling, and vision / OCR) on this
build and on every derived FP8 / GGUF quant down to IQ2_XXS.

Multimodal (vision)

The vision tower is preserved byte-for-byte — all 333 visual.* tensors are kept in BF16 and the merger
/ image + video preprocessor configs are intact, so this stays a full vision-language model
(Qwen3_5ForConditionalGeneration), a drop-in for the base. Abliteration only edits the language-model
residual writers, so image understanding is architecturally unaffected (and image-conditioned refusals are
reduced along with text ones).

Usage

transformers

import torch
from transformers import AutoProcessor, AutoModelForImageTextToText

model_id = "orcarouter/Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored"
processor = AutoProcessor.from_pretrained(model_id)
model = AutoModelForImageTextToText.from_pretrained(model_id, torch_dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="auto")

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Prove that sqrt(2) is irrational."}]
inputs = processor.apply_chat_template(
    messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=True,
    return_dict=True, return_tensors="pt",
    enable_thinking=True
).to(model.device)
output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=512)
print(processor.decode(output[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

Toggle thinking per call with enable_thinking; pass image content parts for vision.

Self-host with vLLM (OpenAI-compatible, full BF16)

docker run -d --name qwen38-uncensored --gpus all --ipc=host --shm-size=8g \
  -v /path/to/Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored:/model:ro \
  -p 8000:8000 vllm/vllm-openai:v0.24.0 \
  --model /model --served-model-name Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored \
  --speculative-config '{"method":"mtp","num_speculative_tokens":2}' \
  --gpu-memory-utilization 0.92 \
  --max-model-len 262144 --trust-remote-code \
  --reasoning-parser qwen3 \
  --enable-auto-tool-choice --tool-call-parser qwen3_coder

BF16 weights are ~56 GB — needs a single H100 80 GB / H200 (or tensor-parallel across two 48 GB
GPUs). For smaller footprints use the FP8
(~31 GB) or GGUF (down to ~9 GB) releases.

Via OrcaRouter (hosted API — no setup)

from openai import OpenAI
client = OpenAI(base_url="https://api.orcarouter.ai/v1", api_key="sk-orca-...")
resp = client.chat.completions.create(
    model="qwen/qwen3.8-27b",
    messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello!"}],
)
print(resp.choices[0].message.content)

Hardware requirements

  • Inference (BF16): ~56 GB weights + KV cache → a single H100 80 GB or H200 143 GB; or
    tensor-parallel across 2× 48 GB. Use FP8 / GGUF for less VRAM.
  • Fine-tuning: full-FT needs multi-GPU (weights + optimizer states + activations); LoRA / QLoRA fits on
    a single 48–80 GB GPU.
  • Software: transformers ≥ 5.12 (Qwen3.5 / 3.8 support) or vllm/vllm-openai:v0.24.0.

Bias, risks, and limitations

  • Safety guardrails removed — the model will produce harmful, biased, or offensive content on request.
    See the disclaimer above.
  • It inherits any biases and limitations of the base Qwen3.8-27B.
  • The reported refusal metric is a rule-based heuristic; evaluate rigorously for your own use case.

License

Apache 2.0, inherited from the base model
Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B. Abliteration does not change the underlying
license obligations.

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