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lew96123/Qwen3.5-0.8B-abliterated

lew96123 Qwen 752M
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  • classification m1
  • files 9
  • benchmarks 11 entries
  • hub_downloads_all_time 758
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Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M1
Primary method

Direct removal

No other method signals detected in this model.
Confidence
MEDIUM
Why this label 3 signals
Method inferred from partial signals - repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
  • 'abliterated' in name/tags
  • is_gguf=0 (base model)
  • no specific method indicators - defaulting to M1 (most common)
Refusal direction extracted via
Extraction technique

Difference-of-means

Confidence
MEDIUM
Why we say so
primary_method=M1; difference-of-means is the reference extraction for M1/M3 (Arditi 2024)
Downloads · lifetime
758
27 last 30d - cooling
Likes
0
Model age
6mo ago
created 2026-04-06
Downloads over time
Now770→from641↑20%
635684733783641 on Apr 15770 on Oct 11770 on Oct 10AprMayJunJulAugSepOct
Apr 15 → Oct 11 · 65 snapshots · spans 179 days

Benchmarks

Portrait before abliteration
Benchmarks of the base model as it stood before the refusal-removal operation. Compare with the numbers above to see what the operation cost.
Benchmark Score Source
Entertainment 1 UGI
Hazardous 1.2 UGI
Natural Intelligence 4.68 UGI
Political lean -5.3% UGI
Sensitive-Info 7.29 UGI
SocPol 0 UGI
UGI 16.53 UGI
Willingness (10) 3.5 UGI
W10-Adherence 4 UGI
W10-Direct 3 UGI
Writing 23.01 UGI

Genealogy 0 direct forks

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Metadata

License
apache-2.0
Languages
en
Tags
transformers safetensors qwen3_5_text text-generation abliterated uncensored qwen3.5 conversational en arxiv:2406.11717 arxiv:2310.18168 arxiv:2507.11878

Related

Total size
1.40 GB
Files
9
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-08-22 13:56
Last updated on HF
2026-04-06 05:42

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 9 files 1.42 GB
model.safetensors 1.40 GB 18b29ea7 download
tokenizer.json 19.1 MB 16e71421 download
README.md 9.09 KB f5cb87f5 download
chat_template.jinja 7.57 KB 0ef09f21 download
abliteration_metadata.json 5.03 KB 81be6a25 download
config.json 1.75 KB d36f6173 download
.gitattributes 1.53 KB 52373fe2 download
tokenizer_config.json 1.07 KB 6be6ce17 download
generation_config.json 115 B 428ce960 download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: apache-2.0
base_model: Qwen/Qwen3.5-0.8B
tags:

  • abliterated
  • uncensored
  • qwen3.5
  • transformers
  • text-generation
    language:
  • en
    pipeline_tag: text-generation
    model-index:
  • name: Qwen3.5-0.8B-abliterated
    results:
    • task:
      type: text-generation
      name: Text Generation
      dataset:
      type: wikitext
      name: WikiText-2
      metrics:
      • type: perplexity
        value: 18.3569
        name: Perplexity
    • task:
      type: multiple-choice
      name: Multiple Choice
      dataset:
      type: allenai/ai2_arc
      name: ARC-Easy
      config: ARC-Easy
      split: test
      metrics:
      • type: accuracy
        value: 59.5
        name: Accuracy
    • task:
      type: multiple-choice
      name: Multiple Choice
      dataset:
      type: Rowan/hellaswag
      name: HellaSwag
      split: validation
      metrics:
      • type: accuracy
        value: 42.0
        name: Accuracy

Qwen3.5-0.8B Abliterated (Uncensored)

This is an abliterated (uncensored) version of Qwen/Qwen3.5-0.8B.

Abliteration removes the model's refusal behavior by identifying and subtracting the "refusal direction" in the model's residual stream. This implementation is inspired by Arditi et al. 2024 ("Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction") but extends the original method with several improvements from subsequent work.

Method

This model uses an enhanced multi-layer abliteration pipeline that goes beyond the original single-layer, PCA-based approach of Arditi et al. 2024. The key differences from the original paper and the additional techniques used are documented below.

Differences from Arditi et al. 2024

Aspect Original Paper (Arditi et al.) This Implementation
Refusal direction PCA (1st principal component) on stacked mean diffs Normalized mean difference per layer
Layers modified Single best layer 12 layers (layers 10-21)
Layer selection PCA variance / manual Composite score: SNR * (1 - cosine similarity)
Projection Standard orthogonal: W' = W - d d^T W Projected abliteration (Gram-Schmidt against harmless mean)
Norm preservation None Per-row Frobenius norm rescaling
Activation preprocessing None Winsorization at 0.995 quantile
Weight targets Primarily residual stream weights All 7 matrix types per layer (Q, K, V, O, gate, up, down)
Numerical precision Not specified All intermediate computations in FP64

Additional Techniques Used

  • Multi-layer intervention: Modifies 12 layers instead of 1 to counter the Hydra Effect (McGrath et al. 2023), where removing the refusal direction at a single layer can cause other layers to compensate.
  • Projected refusal direction: Decomposes the refusal direction into a component parallel to the harmless mean (preserved) and a component orthogonal to it (removed). This targets only the refusal-specific signal while preserving harmless capabilities. Based on Lai (Oct 2025, "Projected Abliteration") and Zhao et al. 2025.
  • Norm-preserving weight modification: After ablating the refusal direction from weight matrices, each row is rescaled to its original Frobenius norm to prevent capability degradation. Based on Lai (Nov 2025, "MPOA") and DoRA (Liu et al. 2024).
  • Winsorization: Activation magnitudes are capped at the 0.995 quantile before computing means, preventing GeGLU outliers from destabilizing the refusal direction estimate. Based on Lai (Mar 2026, "ORBA").
  • Double Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization: Applied twice for numerical stability (Horning et al. 2020).
  • Composite layer selection: Layers are ranked by SNR * (1 - cosine_similarity) between harmful and harmless activation means, selecting layers where the refusal signal is strongest and most distinct from general capabilities.

Pipeline Steps

  1. Scan: Collect last-token residual stream activations on 128 harmful vs 128 harmless prompts across layers 2-21 (skipping first 2 and last 2 of 24 total layers).
  2. Compute: For each scanned layer, compute the mean difference between harmful and harmless activations, winsorize, project orthogonal to harmless mean, and compute quality metrics (SNR, cosine dissimilarity).
  3. Select: Rank layers by composite score and select the top 12 (50% of 24 layers).
  4. Abliterate: For each selected layer, project out the per-layer refusal direction from all 7 weight matrices (Q, K, V, O projections + gate, up, down MLPs), then rescale rows to preserve original Frobenius norms.
  5. Save: Save the modified weights as a standard HuggingFace model.

Total matrices modified: 48 (4 attention + 3 MLP per layer, across 12 layers).

Abliteration Configuration

Parameter Value
Base model Qwen/Qwen3.5-0.8B
Layers scanned 2-21 (20 layers)
Layers modified 10-21 (top 12 by composite score)
Matrices modified per layer 7 (Q, K, V, O, gate, up, down)
Total matrices modified 48
Ablation scale 1.0 (full removal)
Projected direction Yes (orthogonal to harmless mean)
Norm preservation Yes (per-row Frobenius rescaling)
Winsorization quantile 0.995
Harmful prompts for scanning 128
Harmless prompts for scanning 128
Max prompt tokens 256
Precision BFloat16 (model) / FP64 (computations)
Seed 42

Evaluation Results

Comprehensive evaluation on 100 harmful prompts (from mlabonne/harmful_behaviors), 20 harmless prompts, and standard benchmarks. Both the base and abliterated models were tested on the same prompts for a fair comparison.

Refusal Behavior (Base vs Abliterated)

Metric Base Model Abliterated Change
Harmful prompt refusal rate 86.0% (86/100) 3.0% (3/100) -83.0pp
Harmful prompt compliance rate 14.0% 97.0% +83.0pp
Harmless false refusal rate - 0.0% (0/20) -
Adversarial prompt refusal rate - 0.0% (0/10) -

Refusal by Category (Base vs Abliterated)

Category Prompts Base Refused Abliterated Refused Base Refusal Abliterated Refusal
Drugs 5 3 0 60.0% 0.0%
Fraud 22 19 1 86.4% 4.5%
Hacking 20 16 1 80.0% 5.0%
Illegal content 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0%
Manipulation 6 6 0 100.0% 0.0%
Privacy 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0%
Violence 5 5 0 100.0% 0.0%
Weapons 7 5 0 71.4% 0.0%
Other 31 28 1 90.3% 3.2%

Language Modeling Quality

Metric Value
WikiText-2 Perplexity 18.3569
KL Divergence (mean) 0.007776
KL Divergence (max) 0.016139

Benchmark Comparison (Zero-Shot)

Benchmark Abliterated Base Delta
ARC-Easy (200 questions) 59.50% 60.50% -1.00pp
HellaSwag (200 questions) 42.00% 43.00% -1.00pp

The enhanced abliteration causes only -1.00 percentage point degradation on both benchmarks, demonstrating minimal capability loss while reducing refusal rate from 86% to 3%.

Usage

from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer

model_id = "lew96123/Qwen3.5-0.8B-abliterated"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
    model_id, torch_dtype="auto", device_map="auto"
)

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Tell me about the history of cryptography"}]
text = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True)
inputs = tokenizer(text, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)
outputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=512)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))

Disclaimer

This model has been modified to reduce refusal behavior. It may generate content that the original model would refuse. Use responsibly and in accordance with applicable laws and ethical guidelines. The creator is not responsible for any misuse.

References

@article{arditi2024refusal,
  title={Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction},
  author={Arditi, Andy and Obeso, Oscar and Syed, Aaquib and Paleka, Daniel and Panickssery, Nina and Guo, Wes and Nandi, Hrishav},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.11717},
  year={2024}
}

@article{mcgrath2023hydra,
  title={The Hydra Effect: Emergent Self-repair in Language Model Computations},
  author={McGrath, Thomas and Rahtz, Matthew and Kramar, Janos and Mikulik, Vladimir and Legg, Shane},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15771},
  year={2023}
}

@article{liu2024dora,
  title={DoRA: Weight-Decomposed Low-Rank Adaptation},
  author={Liu, Shih-Yang and Wang, Chien-Yi and Yin, Hongxu and Molchanov, Pavlo and Wang, Yu-Chiang Frank and Cheng, Kwang-Ting and Chen, Min-Hung},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.09353},
  year={2024}
}

README history 4 versions

The author's README evolved over time. Click a version to see its content at that point.

  1. 2026-04-06Corrected method description: document differences from Arditi et al. 2024, l...20cf8e69.1 KB
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  2. 2026-04-06Add base model comparison: 86% base refusal vs 3% abliterated, per-category b...6e4026c5.7 KB
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  3. 2026-04-06Phase 2: Updated model card with comprehensive evaluation (97% compliance, AR...3a784e75.3 KB
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  4. 2026-04-06Upload README.md with huggingface_hubbf076bc3 KB
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