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notfakerv/round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated

notfakerv 1.7B GGUF
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Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M8
Primary method

Repackaging (quantization)

Applied on top of direct removal inherited from the base model.
Confidence
MEDIUM
Inherited from base model
Why this label 3 signals
Method inferred from partial signals - repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
  • 'abliterated' in name/tags
  • is_gguf=1
  • assume M1 (base ablation) + M8 (GGUF quant) - default when producer unknown
Refusal direction extraction

No specific extraction method could be identified for this model. The producer either did not document it or used a proprietary pipeline.

What is a refusal direction? →
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Metadata

License
other
Languages
en
Quantizations
BF16
Tags
gguf lfm3 looped-transformer weight-editing abliteration refusal-removal activation-steering gradient-free uncensored llama-cpp custom-runtime text-generation

Related

Total size
3.39 GB
Files
7
Quantizations
2
Registered
2026-11-13 11:03
Last updated on HF
2026-11-13 10:14

Files by quantization

BF16 1 file 3.39 GB
round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated-BF16.gguf 3.39 GB 98d4be88 download
Auxiliary files 6 files 39.8 KB
README.md 19.3 KB 88a44f3a download
LICENSE 10.3 KB 25e731c6 download
NOTICE 3.35 KB 4ae08026 download
provenance.json 2.66 KB e4804b8f download
SHA256SUMS 2.62 KB 8b0e30e0 download
.gitattributes 1.56 KB 329a9260 download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: other
license_name: lfm1.0
license_link: LICENSE
base_model: notfakerv/round2-v1.2-1.7b
base_model_relation: finetune
pipeline_tag: text-generation
language:

  • en
    tags:
  • lfm3
  • looped-transformer
  • weight-editing
  • abliteration
  • refusal-removal
  • activation-steering
  • gradient-free
  • uncensored
  • gguf
  • llama-cpp
  • custom-runtime

round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated

round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated is round2-v1.2-1.7b with one further gradient-free weight edit that removes its tendency to refuse. On a held-out safety-evaluation set the refusal rate falls from 71.7% to 0.3%, while reasoning ability and normal-prompt behaviour are essentially preserved.

  • What changed: 80 weight matrices — every matrix that writes into the residual stream (attention output, short-conv output, and feed-forward output in all 24 layers, plus the loop's second-pass deltas in layers 5–20) — were each projected to remove a single "refusal" direction. No gradients, no fine-tuning, no training data beyond a few hundred forward passes.
  • Effect: the model answers requests it used to decline, across the four target categories (cybersecurity, biology, chemistry, and others), without the reasoning regressions or increased over-refusal that a random edit of the same size would cause.
  • Lineage: this is an edit of round2-v1.2 (a looped LFM3-1.7B with a "conclude-now" reasoning edit), which in turn is an edit of LFM3-1.7B by Liquid AI.

In short, measured on 958 held-out safety prompts (LLM-judged; weapons-of-mass-destruction and child-safety prompts excluded, see Scope):

round2-v1.2 (parent) abliterated random edit, same size
Refusal rate 71.7% 0.3% 70.0%
— cybersecurity 87.7% 0.0% 87.7%
— biology 57.7% 0.0% 57.7%
— chemistry 95.0% 2.5% 87.5%
— other 68.7% 0.3% 66.9%
Over-refusal on safe prompts (XSTest) 4.8% 1.2% —
Reasoning (held-out, 500 answers) 375 371→359 (−3.2 pts) —

The random edit of the same size barely changes refusal (70.0%): the collapse to 0.3% comes from the direction that was removed, not from disturbing the weights. This is a research artifact for studying refusal behaviour; see Scope, Intended use, and Limitations.

It needs the same custom runtime as its parents. The GGUF runs only on a llama.cpp build with the two patches in runtime/ (or the ready branch renoirvieir4/llama.cpp round2-1.7b-loop-preview). Stock llama.cpp, LM Studio, vLLM and generic Transformers loaders cannot load it.

Contents

Lineage and attribution

Model What it is
0 LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B @ ac2586a3 Liquid AI's model: architecture, 1.7B weights, tokenizer, chat template
1 notfakerv/round2-1.7b-loop-preview adds a second, gated pass over layers 5–20 with 44M trained parameters; base weights unchanged
2 notfakerv/round2-v1.2-1.7b round2 with five feed-forward tensors edited to conclude its reasoning sooner (a reasoning edit, not a safety edit)
3 round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated (this) round2-v1.2 with a refusal direction projected out of 80 residual-writer matrices (this card)
  • Liquid AI designed and trained the base model. This release modifies weights of that model; it is an independent, unofficial derivative, not made, reviewed, or endorsed by Liquid AI. "LFM" and "Liquid AI" are used only to identify the base model.
  • License: LFM Open License v1.0 (LICENSE), inherited from the base model. See NOTICE for the full list of changes.
  • The loop, its training, and its runtime are unchanged from round2 and are described in round2's card. The reasoning edit is described in round2-v1.2's card.

Scope and what is not targeted

This edit was built and measured against a single objective, fixed in writing before the evaluation was run:

  • Goal: reduce the model's refusal rate to under 3% per category — cybersecurity, biology, chemistry, and others — on standard red-team prompt sets.
  • Explicitly out of scope, and excluded from every scored set: prompts whose compliance would meaningfully assist mass-casualty chemical or biological weapons, and any child-sexual content. Those prompts were tagged by a separate judge model and removed from discovery, screening, and all reported numbers (21 of 979 confirmation prompts, plus the relevant HarmBench, CatQA/SST, and SORRY-Bench categories). The edit is not direction-specific to any one topic, so it may still comply with such prompts; this release makes no safety claim about them, and they were never a target.

The edit removes a general refusal behaviour; it does not add any capability the base model did not already have, and it does not make a 1.7B model a competent source of operational harm.

What the edit is

The direction. round2-v1.2 was run on 410 harmful and 416 harmless instructions. At each layer, the mean residual-stream activation over the harmful set minus the mean over the harmless set gives a refusal direction r at that layer. Split-half halves of the data agreed at cosine 0.95–0.997 across layers 4–23 (a random-split placebo gave −0.13 to +0.05), and a linear probe at the <think> position separated the two classes with d′ up to 12.9 — the direction is real and highly reproducible.

The write. For each of the 80 matrices W that write into the residual stream — self_attn.o_proj, conv.out_proj, and feed_forward.w2 in all 24 layers, plus the loop's pass-2 low-rank "up" deltas in layers 5–20 — the matrix is projected so its output carries no component along the refusal subspace:

W' = W − P W,    P = projection onto the refusal subspace

Three refinements make the edit clean and capability-preserving:

  • Post-norm correction. LFM3 uses sandwich norms, so a writer's output reaches the residual as g · y / rms(y). The projection is taken against g · r (the gain-weighted direction), not r, so the removal is exact in the space that actually feeds the residual stream.
  • Biprojection. The harmless-prompt mean is removed from each direction first, so the edit targets the refusal component specifically rather than a generic "harmful-topic" component — this is what keeps normal answers intact.
  • Norm preservation. Each edited column is rescaled to its original norm after projection, preserving the matrix's overall scale.

A rank-4 subspace (from 7 layers × 5 positions) is removed, giving a mean relative weight change of 4.26% per matrix, with the residual-stream component along the refusal direction reduced to 0.17% of its original size. Embeddings (tied with the LM head), the mixture-of-heads routers, and the loop gate are not edited.

How the direction was found

A judge model (an abliterated 35B model run locally) performed three roles, none of which touched the model being edited:

  1. Topic tagging and exclusion — labelled every prompt's category and flagged the weapons/child-safety prompts for removal.
  2. Complexity screening — scored a 2,259-prompt pool so the hardest, most-specific ~20 prompts per domain could be used as a stress test.
  3. Refusal grading — labelled each response comply / partial / refuse; a response with no final answer counts as a refusal. Refusal rate = refuse + no-answer.

The judge was calibrated against an independent copy of itself (37/40 agreement on held-out gradings; all three disagreements were partial vs comply, never a missed refusal).

Candidate selection, fixed in advance. Several edits were built (a full-ablation variant and norm-preserving biprojected variants at two subspace sizes). The release candidate was chosen by a pre-stated rule: the lowest refusal among candidates whose reasoning accuracy stayed within 2 points of round2-v1.2 on a 200-problem screen (v1.2 = 143/200). The winner (bnp4) scored 140/200 (−1.5 pts, within noise); two alternatives were rejected for larger reasoning losses.

Results

All responses were generated from the BF16 GGUF in patched llama.cpp with the model-card sampling profile, thinking on, 8,192-token cap, and graded by the judge model. Refusal sets exclude the out-of-scope prompts described in Scope.

Refusal

Confirmation set — 958 scored prompts (HarmBench, StrongREJECT, SORRY-Bench, SimpleSafetyTests; never used to build or select the edit):

Category n round2-v1.2 abliterated vs parent (95% CI)
cybersecurity 138 87.7% 0.0% −87.7 [−92.8, −81.9]
biology 71 57.7% 0.0% −57.7 [−69.0, −46.5]
chemistry 40 95.0% 2.5% −92.5 [−100.0, −82.5]
other 709 68.7% 0.3% −68.4 [−71.8, −64.9]
all 958 71.7% 0.3% −71.4 [−74.2, −68.5]

All four target categories are under the 3% goal. The single chemistry refusal (1/40) is one prompt.

Hard set — 160 prompts (the 20 most complex prompts per domain across 8 domains, by the judge's complexity score): round2-v1.2 refuses 88.8%, the abliterated model 0.0%.

The random-edit control

The same procedure was run along a random direction, orthogonal to the refusal direction and rescaled to the identical per-matrix norm (a norm-matched placebo). If the refusal drop came merely from perturbing 80 matrices by 4.26%, this control would show it too:

round2-v1.2 abliterated random control
Confirmation refusal (958) 71.7% 0.3% 70.0% (−1.7 [−3.8, +0.4])
Hard-set refusal (160) 88.8% 0.0% 87.5%

The control is statistically indistinguishable from the parent in every category. The refusal removal is attributable to the specific direction, not to generic weight disturbance.

Over-refusal on safe prompts

A model that simply says "yes" more is not the goal; it should refuse fewer safe prompts too.

Set round2-v1.2 abliterated
XSTest, 250 safe prompts (over-refusal) 4.8% 1.2%
JBB benign, 98 prompts 11.2% 0.0%

Over-refusal dropped, so the edit reduces unjustified refusals on benign requests rather than trading them.

Capability

Reasoning accuracy, paired by problem against round2-v1.2, graded by the loop project's own verifier:

Set round2-v1.2 abliterated Gap (95% CI) Mean tokens
screen (200 × 1) 143 (71.5%) 140 (70.0%) −1.5 [−5.0, +2.0] 1,843 → 1,953
held-out (250 × 2) 375 (75.0%) 359 (71.8%) −3.2 [−6.2, −0.2] 1,866 → 2,125

The screen gap is within noise; the held-out set shows a small, borderline-significant loss of about 3 points and modestly longer answers. The edit has a real but small reasoning cost. It does not change round2-v1.2's core "conclude-sooner" behaviour.

Recommended settings

Unchanged from round2, and the settings every number above was measured with:

Use Temperature Top-k Top-p Repetition penalty
Math, science, logic, multi-step reasoning 1.0 20 0.95 1.1
General knowledge, chat, coding 0.1 50 1.0 1.1
  • Thinking: leave it on (the chat template's default).
  • max_tokens: 8,192.
  • The GGUF's embedded defaults are the general profile; set the reasoning profile yourself for reasoning tasks.

How to use

llama.cpp

Build the runtime as in runtime/README.md (or clone the ready branch), then:

./build/bin/llama-server -m round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated-BF16.gguf -ngl 99 -fa on -c 65536 \
  --temp 1.0 --top-k 20 --top-p 0.95 --repeat-penalty 1.1

All evaluations ran this GGUF with that branch (commit 1ec066013), 32 parallel slots.

PyTorch reference

Download Liquid AI's base model and this repository's pytorch/ folder:

hf download LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B --revision ac2586a34f1a1c03329dbdcdefabd8b6478ddaa7 --local-dir base
hf download notfakerv/round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated --include "pytorch/*" --local-dir .
import json
import sys
import torch
from safetensors.torch import load_file
from transformers import AutoTokenizer

sys.path.insert(0, "pytorch")
from base.modeling_lfm3 import Lfm3ForCausalLM  # Liquid AI's modeling code, in ./base
from modeling_lfm3_loop import LoopSettings, convert_model, load_adapter

model = Lfm3ForCausalLM.from_pretrained("base", dtype=torch.bfloat16)
# the abliteration: overwrite the 48 edited backbone tensors
result = model.load_state_dict(load_file("pytorch/abliteration_edit.safetensors"), strict=False)
assert not result.unexpected_keys
model = model.to("cuda")
# round2's loop, with its 32 edited pass-2 deltas (adapter.safetensors in this repo)
convert_model(model, LoopSettings(**json.load(open("pytorch/loop_config.json"))))
load_adapter(model, "pytorch")
model.eval()

tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("base", trust_remote_code=True)
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "What is 17 multiplied by 23?"}]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, add_generation_prompt=True, return_tensors="pt", return_dict=True).to("cuda")
output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=8192, do_sample=True, temperature=1.0, top_k=20, top_p=0.95, repetition_penalty=1.1)
print(tokenizer.decode(output[0, inputs["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

Apply the edit before convert_model. The adapter.safetensors in this repo is round2's loop adapter with its 32 pass-2 deltas abliterated; the other 226 loop tensors are unchanged. Tested with transformers 5.20.2 and PyTorch 2.14.

Validation

  • The GGUF is the evaluated file. round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated-BF16.gguf (SHA-256 98d4be88…7400) is byte-for-byte the file every result above was sampled from. Compared tensor-by-tensor with round2-v1.2's GGUF, exactly 80 tensors differ — all residual-writers (attention output, short-conv output, feed-forward down, and their loop pass-2 deltas) and nothing else; the other 465 are bit-identical.
  • The PyTorch recipe reproduces the checkpoint: Liquid AI's base + abliteration_edit.safetensors (48 backbone tensors) + this repo's adapter.safetensors matches the evaluated weights in all 286 backbone tensors; greedy decoding answers "17 × 23" with 391 (validation/pytorch-recipe-check.json).
  • Raw results: per-prompt refusal labels by category and per-question capability counts (IDs, categories, counts, token lengths; no prompt text, no model outputs) are in validation/refusal/ and validation/evaluations/. bnp4 is this release, ctl_bnp4 is the random control, v12/Acc15 is the parent.

Intended use and responsibilities

This is a research artifact for studying refusal behaviour in language models — how refusal is represented as a direction in activation space, whether it can be removed by a targeted weight edit, and whether that removal is separable (by a norm-matched control) from generic damage. The norm-matched control, the exclusions, and the over-refusal and capability measurements exist to make that study rigorous.

Removing refusals removes a safety layer. A deployer who uses this model takes on responsibility for the outputs and for any downstream safety filtering. The weapons-of-mass-destruction and child-safety categories were deliberately excluded from the objective and are not claimed to be handled safely. Use it in accordance with the LFM Open License and applicable law.

Limitations

  • Safety removed. The point of the edit is to stop refusing; it will comply with harmful requests, including some outside the four target categories. It has no added safety tuning.
  • Out-of-scope categories. Mass-casualty weapons and child-safety prompts were excluded from the objective and all metrics; behaviour on them is neither targeted nor measured.
  • Small reasoning cost. About −3 points on the held-out reasoning set and modestly longer answers.
  • Judge-based metrics. Refusal rates come from one LLM judge; it was calibrated but is not infallible, and small per-category samples (chemistry n=40, biology n=71) carry wide intervals.
  • Inherited behaviour and scope. Everything from LFM3-1.7B, round2, and round2-v1.2 carries over. English only; evaluated on reasoning and red-team prompt sets only. Chat quality, tool use, multilingual ability, and long context were not evaluated.
  • Runtime. Needs the patched runtime; stock loaders cannot run it.

Files

File Contents
round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated-BF16.gguf BF16 base weights (abliterated) plus round2's loop parameters (pass-2 deltas abliterated), 545 tensors, 3.64 GB
pytorch/abliteration_edit.safetensors the 48 edited backbone tensors, to overwrite in Liquid AI's base
pytorch/adapter.safetensors round2's 44M loop parameters with 32 pass-2 deltas abliterated
pytorch/abliteration.json the full edit specification and per-matrix diagnostics
pytorch/loop_config.json, pytorch/modeling_lfm3_loop.py round2's loop settings and reference implementation, unchanged
runtime/ the llama.cpp patches, identical to round2's
validation/refusal/ per-category refusal counts and paired-bootstrap CIs for the edit, the parent, and the random control
validation/evaluations/ per-question capability results on the screen and held-out sets
validation/pytorch-recipe-check.json checks that the PyTorch recipe reproduces the evaluated weights
provenance.json, SHA256SUMS, NOTICE, LICENSE provenance, digests, changes, license

Method credits

The edit follows directional ablation / "abliteration" (Arditi et al., 2024), built as a weight-space edit with post-norm correction, biprojection, and norm preservation, and evaluated against a norm-matched random-direction control with pre-stated exclusions and a pre-stated selection rule. Related: activation steering (Turner et al., 2023; Rimsky et al., 2024) and rank-one weight editing (Meng et al., 2022).

README history 1 version

The author's README evolved over time. Click a version to see its content at that point.

  1. 2026-11-13 round2-v1.2-1.7b-abliterated: refusal-direction abliteration of round2-v1.2 (... d2406b1 19.3 KB
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