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orcarouter/LFM3-1.7B-abliterated

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Abliteration classifier · v1.0.0
M1
Primary method

Direct removal

No other method signals detected in this model.
Confidence
MEDIUM
Why this label 3 signals
Method inferred from partial signals - repository name, related files, or tag patterns. Producer identity not confirmed; label may sharpen or shift as we gather more evidence.
  • 'abliterated' in name/tags
  • is_gguf=0 (base model)
  • no specific method indicators - defaulting to M1 (most common)
Refusal direction extracted via
Extraction technique

Difference-of-means

Confidence
MEDIUM
Why we say so
primary_method=M1; difference-of-means is the reference extraction for M1/M3 (Arditi 2024)
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Model age
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created 2026-11-02

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Metadata

License
other
Languages
en ar zh fr de it ja ko pt es vi th id hi ru pl
Tags
transformers safetensors lfm3 text-generation liquid edge conversational custom_code abliterated uncensored ai-red-team en

Related

Total size
3.22 GB
Files
13
Quantizations
1
Registered
2026-11-02 11:02
Last updated on HF
2026-11-02 10:12

Files by quantization

Auxiliary files 13 files 3.24 GB
model.safetensors 3.22 GB ******** download
tokenizer.json 17.1 MB ******** download
modeling_lfm3.py 41.4 KB 0ccffc7e download
chat_template.jinja 11.8 KB d0747b8b download
LICENSE 10.3 KB 25e731c6 download
README.md 10.1 KB 5796255a download
lfm3_conv.py 8.33 KB a1b67afd download
configuration_lfm3.py 5.97 KB a3cc0e72 download
tokenizer_config.json 1.82 KB aed9ef7d download
.gitattributes 1.53 KB 52373fe2 download
config.json 1.45 KB d4eb9bf8 download
generation_config.json 328 B 51060b9b download
special_tokens_map.json 92.0 B 5d871daa download

README current version from Hugging Face


license: other
license_name: lfm1.0
license_link: LICENSE
language:

  • en
  • ar
  • zh
  • fr
  • de
  • it
  • ja
  • ko
  • pt
  • es
  • vi
  • th
  • id
  • hi
  • ru
  • pl
    pipeline_tag: text-generation
    library_name: transformers
    base_model: LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B
    base_model_relation: finetune
    tags:
  • liquid
  • lfm3
  • edge
  • conversational
  • custom_code
  • abliterated
  • uncensored
  • ai-red-team

OrcaRouter

LFM3-1.7B-abliterated

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Post-trained for cybersecurity: vulnerability analysis, vulnerability reproduction, red teaming & offensive-security research. 98.01% pass@1 on CyberGym Level 1 · 1M context · function calling · OpenAI-compatible API.

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The uncensored LFM3-1.7B — a 1.7B hybrid conv + attention model that runs on the edge.

~3.4 GB in bf16 · fits a single consumer GPU · Hugging Face Transformers

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LFM3-1.7B with the refusal direction removed.

This is the abliterated (refusal-removed) build of
LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B, a 1.7B-parameter
hybrid short-conv + attention model (24 layers: 13 gated short-conv blocks + 11
grouped-query-attention blocks, 6 of them full and 5 sliding-window). Weights are
bf16 safetensors — load it straight into Hugging Face Transformers.

A single refusal direction was estimated with the diff-of-means method (Arditi et al.
2024) and orthogonalized out of every matrix that writes the residual stream. The model
keeps the base's capabilities while declining far less often.


⚠️ Disclaimer — read before use

This model is abliterated: its safety alignment has been substantially reduced.
The refusal direction was orthogonalized out of every residual-stream writer, so it will
comply with many harmful, unethical, offensive, or illegal requests that the original
LFM3-1.7B would refuse.

  • Released strictly for legitimate research: interpretability, AI-safety and
    refusal-mechanism study, red-teaming, and robustness evaluation.
  • You assume full responsibility for how you use it and for everything it generates.
    Add your own safety, moderation, and abuse-prevention layers before any deployment.
  • Use must comply with the LFM Open License v1.0 inherited from the base
    model, and with all applicable law.
  • The authors accept no liability for misuse. Its outputs do not reflect the views
    of the uploaders or of Liquid AI.

Evaluation

The base and abliterated checkpoints were scored with identical prompts, splits and seed
(both runs under the same code revision, so they are directly comparable).

Setup.

  • Runtime: Hugging Face Transformers, bf16, single H200.
  • Decoding: greedy, thinking disabled (enable_thinking=False → the template renders a
    pre-closed <think></think>).
  • Scoring: refusal is judged by a rule-based opening-phrase classifier (not an LLM
    judge). Treat the numbers as indicative, not publication-grade: a 0% refusal rate is a
    statement about phrasing, and the caveat (hedging) column carries the rest.

Safety: harmful-prompt refusal (lower = more uncensored). Average 2.8%, against
87.3% for the base model.

Benchmark n Base Abliterated Δ
AdvBench 100 98.0% 2.0% −96.0
JailbreakBench (harmful) 100 93.0% 2.0% −91.0
StrongREJECT 150 82.0% 1.3% −80.7
HarmBench (standard) 150 81.3% 4.0% −77.3
MaliciousInstruct 100 95.0% 0.0% −95.0
SimpleSafetyTests 50 94.0% 8.0% −86.0
ForbiddenQuestions 150 68.0% 2.0% −66.0

Over-refusal: benign prompts wrongly refused (lower = better). No induced
over-refusal — the abliterated model is in fact less likely to refuse benign prompts.

Benchmark n Base Abliterated
XSTest-safe 250 15.6% 1.2%
JailbreakBench (benign) 100 17.0% 1.0%

Capability retention. GSM8K and CMMLU are unchanged; MMLU takes a small dip.

Benchmark n Base Abliterated
MMLU (letter) 300 49.0% 45.7%
MMLU-Pro (CoT) ⚠ 250 40.0% 33.2%
GSM8K (CoT) 150 86.0% 86.0%
CMMLU (letter) 500 35.0% 34.6%

⚠ MMLU-Pro is a floor, not a measurement. 33% (base) / 35% (abliterated) of replies
could not be parsed — a 1.7B model is still reasoning when the 1024-token CoT budget runs
out — so that row is budget-limited, not a measured capability loss.

Gated-on-Hub safety sets (AdvBench, StrongREJECT, HarmBench) were read from the benchmark
authors' upstream CSVs; the rest from the Hub.


Usage (Transformers)

The model ships custom code, so load it with trust_remote_code=True. It requires
transformers >= 5.12.

import torch
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer

model_id = "orcarouter/LFM3-1.7B-abliterated"
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id, trust_remote_code=True)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
    model_id, trust_remote_code=True, dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="cuda"
).eval()

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Write a haiku about the ocean."}]
text = tok.apply_chat_template(
    messages, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True, enable_thinking=False
)
enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt").to("cuda")
out = model.generate(**enc, max_new_tokens=256, do_sample=False)
print(tok.decode(out[0][enc.input_ids.shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

Set enable_thinking=True for a reasoning trace inside <think>…</think>.


Abliteration recipe

Method Single refusal direction, diff-of-means (Arditi et al. 2024), massive-activation dims masked
Direction layer hidden-state layer 11 (of 24, frac 0.46), chosen on a validation split
Edited matrices 49 residual-stream writers: attention o_proj ×11, short-conv out_proj ×13, MLP w2 ×24, and the tied token embedding
Max residual leakage 9.8e-03 after orthogonalization (clean)
Not touched q/k/v_proj, conv in_proj, attention gate, MLP w1/w3, norms, router gates

Model details

Base model LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B
Architecture lfm3 (custom code). 24 layers — 13 gated short-conv + 11 GQA attention (6 full, 5 sliding-window 256); hidden 2048, SwiGLU MLP (intermediate 7680); GQA 16 q / 4 kv × 128; tied embeddings
Parameters ~1.7B · Vocabulary 128,000 · Context 262,144
Precision bf16 safetensors (~3.4 GB)
Runtime Hugging Face Transformers ≥ 5.12, trust_remote_code=True; text in, text out

What's in this repo

Path Contents
model.safetensors the abliterated bf16 weights
config.json, generation_config.json model config (with auto_map to the custom code)
configuration_lfm3.py, modeling_lfm3.py, lfm3_conv.py the LFM3 custom code (inherited from the base)
tokenizer.json, tokenizer_config.json, special_tokens_map.json, chat_template.jinja tokenizer + chat template

Bias, risks, and limitations

  • Safety guardrails are substantially reduced — see the disclaimer.
  • Refusal numbers come from a rule-based classifier, not an LLM judge; MMLU-Pro is a
    floor
    (see the ⚠ note), not a measured capability delta.
  • Not measured: long context, agentic / tool use, and multilingual beyond CMMLU.
  • Inherits the biases and limitations of LFM3-1.7B.

License

The LFM Open License v1.0, inherited from the base model
LiquidAI/LFM3-1.7B. See the license for its
terms and prohibited uses.


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